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CASE NOTES
TORTS-INVASION OF PRIVACY-UNAUTHORIZED
USE OF PHOTOGRAPH
Marie Brauer brought an action in tort, on behalf of her son Michael,
for an alleged invasion of privacy. The defendant, Globe Newspaper
Company, had previously published, with permission, a picture of Michael
in connection with an annual Christmas series. Two years later, however,
the defendant, without permission, reproduced the same picture in an
article on mental retardation. Since the first publication was in no way
associated with retardation, Marie Brauer contended that the second
publication constituted an invasion of privacy, in that it created the in-
ference that her son, who in fact was a normal child, was retarded. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that the recognition of
the photograph by neighbors, friends and family of the child "falls short
of the kind of publicity upon which an action for the invasion of privacy,
if acknowledged to exist, would have to be based."' Recovery was, there-
fore denied. Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., - Mass. -- , 217 N.E.
2d 736 (1966).
As yet, no case has determined that there exists in Massachusetts a
legally protected right of privacy.2 The issue has been raised but never
decided, as the courts of Massachusetts have carefully preserved the
question.3 The obvious evasion, in the Brauer case, of the question of
whether or not a right of privacy exists, lends itself to a discussion of the
nature of this tort and what might result from Massachusetts' refusal to
recognize the right of privacy.
One of the best and most explicit definitions of the right of privacy has
been formulated by Professor Cooley,4 who described it as the right to be
let alone.5 This phraseology was adopted and expanded by a Kentucky
court in the leading case of Brents v. Morgan,6 where it was held to be:
1 Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., -- Mass. -- , 217 N.E.2d 736, 740 (1966).
2Thayer v. Worchester Post Publishing Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933);
Marek v. Zanol Products Co., 298 Mass. 1, 8 N.E.2d 393 (1937).
3 Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753(1940). In Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944), the
court considered that the state had rejected the right of privacy; but in Kelley v.
Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951), the question was said to be
still open. See also Frick v. Boyd, 214 N.E.2d 460 (1966).
4 1 CooLEY, TORTS S 360 (3d ed. 1906).
5Id. at 364. °221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
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[tlhe right of privacy is the right of an individual to be free from unwar-
ranted publicity, [or] the right to live without unwarranted interference by
the public about matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned.7
Dean Prosser, a leading authority in the law of torts, has stated that the
law of privacy appears to be a complex of four distinct wrongs, each
being an interference with the plaintiff's right to be let alone.8 The first
of these torts consists of intruding upon plaintiff's physical solitude or
seclusion, as by invading his quarters, 9 or tapping his telephone wires. 10
A second group of cases has found a cause of action in publicity which
violates the ordinary decencies given to private information, even though
the information may be true and no action would lie for defamation.
Thus, publication of a picture of one's deformed child,11 or the details of
a humiliating illness,12 or the fact that he has not paid his debts,18 may
give a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The third tort, which is
in question in the Brauer case, consists of putting the plaintiff in a false,
but not necessarily defamatory, position in the public eye.' 4 Cases in this
category have involved signing one's name to a public telegram,15 or
letter,1 attributing to him views which he does not hold, or using his
picture, as in the Brauer case, to illustrate an article with which he has
7 Id. at 772, 299 S.W. at 970. Similarly, a New Jersey court as said, "the right of
privacy is the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted publicity, or in
other words, to be protected from any wrongful intrusion into his private life which
would outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary
sensibilities." McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 32, 43 A.2d 514, 518 (1945).
8 Prosser, "Privacy," 48 CALIF. L. RFv. 383, 389.
0 Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1924) (woman's bedroom on
steamboat); Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (unlawful entry
by officer); Welsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (entry by landlord).
10 Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931). Accord, McDaniels v.
Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939) (listening to con-
versation with microphone).
11 Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912); Bazemore v. Savannah Hos-
pital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930). In both cases the pictures were obtained in
breach of confidence.
12 Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
1' Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, 181 Ky. 487, 205 S.W. 558 (1918). The same is
true of past history, as where a motion picture revives the memory of the name and
career of a reformed prostitute who was the defendant in a notorious murder trial.
See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
14 PROSSER, TORTS, § 638 (2d ed. 1955).
15 Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941). See Wigmore,
The Right Against False Attribution of Belief or Utterance, 4 Ky. L.J. 3 (1916).
16Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942). The
name of an actress was signed to 1,000 letters to men which apparently suggested an
assignation.
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no reasonable connection.' 7 These three torts are primarily concerned
with the protection of a mental interest, and are only a phase of the larger
problem of the protection of peace of mind against unreasonable dis-
turbance.' Finally, the fourth tort consists of the appropriation of some
element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial use, such as the un-
authorized use of his name or picture for advertising purposes.' 9
The refusal of the Massachusetts courts to recognize an independent
right of privacy stems back to the common law concept of predicating
recovery for the invasion of privacy upon the violation of some other
right, such as contract, express or implied,20 or some property right.21 The
common law courts took no cognizance of a right to be let alone.22 There
was little need to develop such a right in an English society which was
loosely organized and in which news traveled very slowly. Therefore,
early cases relied upon the fictions of implied contract and property rights
to protect an individual's right of privacy.23 They did not recognize that
such a right existed independently.
The invasion of the right of privacy by the publication of a person's
photograph, complained of in the Brauer case, was considered as early as
1888, in the case of Pollard v. Photographic Company.24 The plaintiff,
Miss Pollard, employed a photographer to take her picture. Subsequently,
upon discovering that the picture was being exhibited in the photogra-
pher's shop window as a Christmas card, she brought a bill for an injunc-
tion to restrain the photographer from exhibiting or selling copies of her
photograph. The defendant contended that the court had no jurisdiction
to grant an injunction where there was no injury to the plaintiff's property
and that a person had no property right in his own features. The court,
however, granted the injunction on the grounds that there was an implied
17 Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir., 1951). Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co.,
78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C., 1948); Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 273, 231 P.2d
565 (1951).
18 Harper & McNelly, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional
Distress, Wis. L. REv. 426 (1938); ELDRIDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS, ch. 3 (1941).
19 Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Pallas v. Crow-
ley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948).
2 OAbernathy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209; 1 H & T 28 (1825) as cited in 12 B. U.
L. REv., 353, 361 (1932).
21 Pope v. Curl, 2 Atk. 342, 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (1741) as cited in 12 B. U. L. REv.,
supra note 20.
2241 ILL. BAR J. 121 (1952), noting Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 IIl. App. 293,
106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
23 Supra notes 20 and 21.
24 40 Ch. D 345, 58 L. J. Ch. N. S. 251, 60 L.T. N.S. 418 (1888) as cited in 12 B. U.
L. REv., supra note 20.
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contract not to use the photographs for sale or exhibition and that such a
sale or exhibition amounted to a breach of confidence.2 5
It is apparent that the right of privacy is not a contrivance of modern
times but a right which has been protected under one mode or another
since early times.26 A real impetus was given to the law of privacy by an
article by Messrs. Warren and Brandeis.27 Piecing together old decisions
in which relief had been afforded on the basis of legal fictions,2 the article
concluded that such cases were in reality based upon a broader principle
which was entitled to separate recognition.2 This principle they called
the right to privacy.80 The authors also showed that the theories of implied
contract, trust or confidence, and property right, which perhaps had ren-
dered sufficient protection to the right of privacy up to this time, were
not adequate any more, since the advances in photography had made it
possible to take the picture of another on the sly, and these older theories
would not apply against a stranger.31 Nevertheless, many courts were
reluctant to establish a distinct right of privacy on the theory that to do so
would be to engage in judicial legislation. 2 Thus, in the case of Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,88 the court denied the existence of the right
of privacy and refused injunctive relief when the defendant made use of a
picture of the plaintiff to advertise its flour. The court suggested that a
legislative body might, "provide that no one should be permitted for his
own selfish purpose to use the picture or name of another for advertising
purposes without his consent.18 4
The possible consequences of not recognizing the right of privacy, as
the Massachusetts court has done in the Brauer case, may be seen from the
results of the Roberson case. Immediately after the New York court
handed down the Roberson decision, there was a storm of public disap-
proval."5 It was so severely criticized by the bar as well as by the press36
25 Ibid. 26 Supra notes 20 and 21.
27 The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
28Supra notes 20, 21 and 24. 80 Ibid.
29 Supra note 27, at 213. 31 Id. at 211.
82 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box. Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
88 Ibid. 84 1d. at 545, 64 N.E. at 443.
85 An editorial in 36 AM. L. REv. 636 (1902), said "the decision under review shocks
and wounds the ordinary sense of Justice of mankind. We have heard it alluded to
only in terms of regret."
86 The New York Times of August 23rd, 1902, wrote: "Several glaring illustrations
have of late been furnished of the amazing opinion of Judge Parker of the Ct. of
Appeals of this state, that the right to privacy is not a right which in the State of N.Y.
anybody is bound to respect, or which the courts will lend their aid to enforce. We
happen to know that that decision excited as much amazement among lawyers and
jurists as among the promiscuous lay public...."
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that one of the concurring judges published a law review article in defense
of the decision.37 Consequently, in the next session of the New York
Legislature a statute was enacted making it both a misdemeanor and a tort
to make use of the name, portrait or picture of any person for advertising
purposes or for the purpose of trade, without his written consent. 3s This
statute, however, did not meet the popular demand for the protection of
the right of privacy, because it covered only a limited aspect of the right.3 9
Also, there was a great deal of confusion in interpreting the statute.40
The problem of interpreting the New York statute was encountered in
Wendell v. Conduit Machine Company,41 where a former employee who
had orally consented to the use of his photograph for advertising purposes
brought a bill under the statute to restrain such use. The court, however,
denied an injunction on the grounds that the plaintiff had no standing in a
court of equity because he terminated his employment after his employer
had incurred expenses in connection with the photograph. Nevertheless,
it would seem that since the statute expressly provided, that the use of a
person's photograph for advertising purposes, without his written consent,
was grounds for an injunction and damages, the court should have granted
the plaintiff relief. 42
Three years after the Roberson decision the Supreme Court of Georgia,
in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company,43 was confronted
squarely with the question of whether or not there existed a legally recog-
nized right of privacy. In the Pavesich case, the defendant's advertising
made use of the plaintiff's name and picture, as well as a false testimonial
from him. With the example before it of the confusion in New York due
to a statutory enactment to protect an individual's right of privacy, the
Georgia court rejected the Roberson decision by stating:
With all due respect to Chief Judge Parker and his associates who concurred
with him, we think the conclusion reached by them [in the Roberson case]
was the result of an unconscious yielding to the feeling of conservatism which
naturally arises in the mind of a Judge who faces a proposition which is
novel. The valuable influence upon society and upon the welfare of the
public of the conservatism of the lawyer, whether at the bar or upon the
bench, cannot be overestimated; but this conservatism should not go to the
37 O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. Rv. 437 (1902).
38 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 132, S§ 1-2. Now, as amended in N.Y. Civil Rights Law
1948, §§ 50-51. Held constitutional in Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y.
223, 85 N.E. 1097 (1908).
39 Kacedan, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY, 12 B. U. L. REV. 353, 627 (1932).
4074 Misc. 201, 133 N.Y.S. 758 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Almind v. Sea Beach Ry. Co., 78
Misc. 445, 139 N.Y.S. 559 (1912).
41 Ibid.
42 1d. at 202, 133 N.Y.S. at 759. 48 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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extent of refusing to recognize a right which the instincts of nature prove to
exist, and which nothing in judicial decision, legal history, or writings upon
the law can be called to demonstrate its nonexistence as a legal right.44
Since the Pavesicb case, an overwhelming majority of American juris-
dictions have rejected the Roberson decision and have recognized the right
of privacy as a natural law, non-statutory right.45 The Restatement of
Torts gives recognition to the right and defines it, as follows: "A person
who unreasonably ... interferes with another's interest in not having his
affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to
the other. 48
In conclusion, it may be stated that while a majority of courts are in
favor of recognizing the right of privacy as a common law right,47 Massa-
chusetts remains stubborn in its opposition. This might cause the people
to demand legislation to protect their rights. 48 However, the experience
with the New York Civil Rights Law 49 teaches us that statutory enact-
ments to protect a person's right of privacy are inefficient and inadequate
in dealing with the numerous situations which may arise in this field.
While enacting a statute the legislature usually formulates a rule which
is hard and fast, whereas the courts of Massachusetts can adopt the com-
mon law in its elasticity to different situations. Therefore, notwithstanding
that the Brauer case evades the question of whether or not an independent
right of privacy presently exists, the decision indicates that Massachusetts
may recognize such a right when the question is presented in a proper
case. This is determined from the statement made by the court that the
publication of the photograph of Michael Brauer "falls short of the kind
of publicity upon which an action for the invasion of privacy, if acknowl-
edged to exist, would have to be based."50
Charles Simon
44 1d. at 213, 50 S.E. at 78.
45 Supra notes 6, 11, 12, 17, 43. See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. REv. 383,
386 (1960).
46 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 (1939).
47 Supra note 45. 49 Supra note 38.
48 Kacedan, supra note 39. 50 Supra note 1.
